פרסומים

Policy problems and solutions are frequently loaded with moral, emotional and cost-effectiveness components as well as with other ideational and symbolic elements in order to provide them with, or deprive them of, significance. Skillful policy entrepreneurs are key actors in this valuation process which results in policy problems and solutions becoming valued, overvalued or undervalued. Drawing on insights from the sociology of valuation, this article distinguishes between four types of policy entrepreneurs – defined by the particular strategies they pursue – that may be involved in this process: norm entrepreneurs, reputation entrepreneurs, meaning entrepreneursand standards and performance metrics entrepreneurs. The article elaborates on the role of these actors in the policy valuation process and the interactive nature of their activities. It thereafter illustrates their activities by elaborating on the valuation strategies pursued by the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies, which led several European governments to provide financial support for the Carbon Disclosure Project.

This paper explores the factors that have recently increased support for candidates and causes of the populist right across the developed democracies, especially among a core group of working‐class men. In the context of debates about whether the key causal factors are economic or cultural, we contend that an effective analysis must rest on understanding how economic and cultural developments interact to generate support for populism. We suggest that one way to do so is to see status anxiety as a proximate factor inducing support for populism, and economic and cultural developments as factors that combine to precipitate such anxiety. Using cross‐national survey data from 20 developed democracies, we assess the viability of this approach. We show that lower levels of subjective social status are associated with support for right populist parties, identify a set of economic and cultural developments likely to have depressed the social status of men without a college education, and show that the relative social status of those men has declined since 1987 in many of the developed democracies. We conclude that status effects provide one pathway through which economic and cultural developments may combine to increase support for the populist right.