This research examines the relationship between positive and negative perceptions of pensions and motivation to engage in the decision process of choosing a private pension plan, as well as satisfaction from the chosen pension plan, among trained economists. A sample of 134 economists completed a self-report survey examining the decision process of different decision contexts in life, including pension decisions. Overall, participants showed low motivation to engage in the process of choosing a private pension plan, compared to their motivation to engage in other decision tasks. However, economists invested more in the decision process and showed greater satisfaction from their decision regarding their pension plan when they had a more positive perception of pensions. This perception is represented by higher subjective likelihood of receiving pension allowances for a long period, and by a profitable view of the balance between current payments and expected incomes from pension saving.
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http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2012.01559.x/abst... Byline: MOMI DAHAN(1), MICHEL STRAWCZYNSKI(2) Abstract This paper shows that a policy maker needs only two types of information to set the optimal income tax rate at the top: a measure of labor supply elasticity and the shape of skills distribution. We find that the asymptotic tax rate is not affected by the degree of inequality aversion as long as the marginal utility of consumption converges to zero. By using empirically plausible estimates for the compensated labor supply elasticity and the shape of skills distribution, we find that the optimal marginal tax rate at the top should be between 33% and 60%, which is in line with the existing rates in the real world. Author Affiliation: (1)Hebrew University of Jerusalem, School of Public Policy (2)Hebrew University of Jerusalem, School of Public Policy Article Note: Momi Dahan
This paper uses the unique social structure of Arab communities to examine the effect of social identity on voter turnout. We f?rst show that voters are more likely to vote for a candidate who shares their social group (signified by last name) as compared to other candidates. Using last name as a measure of group affiliation, an inverted U-shaped relationship between group size and voter turnout has been found (borderline significant) which is consistent with theoretical models that reconcile the paradox of voting by incorporating group behavior.