@article {4766,
	title = {On the Popular Support for Progressive Taxation},
	journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory},
	volume = {5},
	number = {4},
	year = {2003},
	pages = {593-604},
	abstract = {This paper develops a political economy model that is consistent with the fact that \&nbsp;democracies have a preference for increasing marginal tax rates on income. We present a\&nbsp;model in which there is an exogenous set of political parties with preferences over the set of\&nbsp;admissible tax schedules. This set contains virtually any increasing and piecewise linear\&nbsp;continuous function. Each party decides whether or not to present a candidate for election.\&nbsp;There is a fixed cost of running. The elected candidate implements one of her preferred tax\&nbsp;policies. Our main results provide conditions under which a Strong Nash Equilibrium exists,\&nbsp;and a tax schedule with increasing marginal tax rates is implemented in some Nash\&nbsp;Equilibria and in any Strong Nash Equilibrium.},
	author = {Esteban F. Klor}
}
