@article {4771,
	title = {The Welfare Effects of Public Opinion Polls},
	journal = {International Journal of Game Theory},
	volume = {35},
	number = {3},
	year = {2007},
	pages = {379-394},
	abstract = {This paper presents an experimental study of the effects of polls on\&nbsp;voters{\textquoteright} welfare. The analysis shows that polls have a different effect on closely\&nbsp;divided and lopsided divided electorates. The data show that in closely divided\&nbsp;electorates (and only for these electorates) the provision of information on the\&nbsp;voters{\textquoteright} distribution of preferences significantly raises the participation of subjects\&nbsp;supporting the slightly larger team relative to the smaller team. This causes\&nbsp;a substantial increase on the frequency of electoral victories of the larger team.\&nbsp;As a consequence, we observe a steep decrease in the welfare of the members of\&nbsp;the smaller team because they vote more often and yet they loose the elections\&nbsp;more frequently. Polls are detrimental to aggregate welfare in closely divided\&nbsp;electorates because the decrease in the payoffs of the minority is stronger than\&nbsp;the increase in the payoffs of the majority. In lopsided divided electorates polls\&nbsp;don{\textquoteright}t have a significant different effect on the voters{\textquoteright} turnout conditional on\&nbsp;their team size. We do observe an increase on the frequency of electoral victories\&nbsp;of the larger team after the provision of information, but this is in part due\&nbsp;to smaller teams{\textquoteright} members voting less frequently and saving the participation\&nbsp;costs. As a consequence, while polls have a negative effect on the relative payoffs\&nbsp;of the minority for these electorates as well, they have a positive effect on\&nbsp;total welfare.},
	author = {Esteban F. Klor and Eyal Winter}
}
