@article {10394,
	title = {Cronyism in State Violence: Evidence from Labor Repression During Argentina\&$\#$39;s Last Dictatorship},
	journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association},
	volume = {19},
	number = {3},
	year = {2021},
	month = {2021},
	pages = {1439-1487},
	abstract = {This paper studies whether crony governance affects the logic behind governments{\textquoteright} targeting of violence, and how the deployment of violence allows politically connected firms to benefit from crony governance.\&nbsp; We address these issues in the context of the Argentine military junta that took power on March 24, 1976.\&nbsp; Specifically, we examine the logic driving the choice of firm level union representatives who were subjected to violence following the coup. \&nbsp;Using an original dataset assembled and digitized by us, we find that political, business and social connections to the regime are associated with an increase of 2 to 3 times in the number of firm level union representatives arrested and/or disappeared. \&nbsp;This is the case even after controlling for a battery of firms{\textquoteright} characteristics that capture alternative explanations for the targeting of violence. \&nbsp;The effect is particularly pronounced in privately owned (as opposed to state-owned) firms, suggesting that the correlation is driven by cronyism for financial gain rather than ideology or information transmission.\&nbsp; We also show that connected firms benefited from violence against union representatives by subsequently having less strikes and a higher market valuation. \&nbsp;Our findings highlight the pervasiveness of ties to the government, even in cases where one of the main stated goals of the regime is to curb cronyism.},
	author = {Esteban F. Klor and Sebastian Saiegh and Shanker Satyanath}
}
