@article {5064,
	title = {Repeated Games with Finite Automata},
	journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
	volume = {59},
	year = {1993},
	pages = {17-32},
	abstract = {Repeated Games with Finite Automata The paper examines the asymptotic behavior of the set of equilibrium payoffs in a repeated game when there are bounds on the complexity of the strategies players may select. The complexity of a strategy is measured by the size of the minimal automaton that can implement it. The main result is that in a zero-sum game, when the size of the automata of both players go together to infinity, the sequence of values converges to the value of the one-shot game. This is true even if the size of the automata of one player is a polynomial of the size of the automata of the other player. The result for the zero-sum games gives an estimate for the general case.\&nbsp;},
	author = {Elchanan Ben-Porath}
}
