תאריך:
ה', 12/04/201814:30-15:30
מיקום:
Manchester Building (Hall 2), Hebrew University Jerusalem
Abstract:
In the past two decades the entropy method has been successfully employed in the study of repeated games. I will present a few results that demonstrate the relations between entropy and memory. More specifically: a finite game is repeated (finitely or infinitely) many times. Each player $i$ is restricted to strategies that can recall only the last $k_i$ stages of history. The goal is to characterize the (asymptotic) set of equilibrium payoffs. Such a characterization is available for two-player games, but not for three players or more.
Related papers:
R. Peretz (2012). The Strategic Value of Recall, Games and Economic Behavior 74 (1), 332-351.
R. Peretz (2013). Correlation through Bounded Recall Strategies, International Journal of Game Theory 42 (4), 867-890.
G. Bavly and R. Peretz (submitted) Towards a theory of repeated games with bounded recall
In the past two decades the entropy method has been successfully employed in the study of repeated games. I will present a few results that demonstrate the relations between entropy and memory. More specifically: a finite game is repeated (finitely or infinitely) many times. Each player $i$ is restricted to strategies that can recall only the last $k_i$ stages of history. The goal is to characterize the (asymptotic) set of equilibrium payoffs. Such a characterization is available for two-player games, but not for three players or more.
Related papers:
R. Peretz (2012). The Strategic Value of Recall, Games and Economic Behavior 74 (1), 332-351.
R. Peretz (2013). Correlation through Bounded Recall Strategies, International Journal of Game Theory 42 (4), 867-890.
G. Bavly and R. Peretz (submitted) Towards a theory of repeated games with bounded recall