@booklet {24527,
	title = {Demystifying the Math of the Coronavirus},
	year = {Working Paper},
	abstract = {We provide an elementary mathematical description of the spread of the coronavirus. We explain two\&nbsp;fundamental relationships: How the rate of growth in new infections is determined by the {\textquotedblleft}effective reproductive\&nbsp;number{\textquotedblright}; and how the effective reproductive number is affected by social distancing. By making a key\&nbsp;approximation, we are able to formulate these relationships very simply and thereby avoid complicated\&nbsp;mathematics. The same approximation leads to an elementary method for estimating the effective eproductivenumber.},
	author = {Elon Kohlberg and Abraham Neyman}
}
@booklet {2909,
	title = {The Cooperative Solution of Stochastic Games},
	year = {2015},
	abstract = {Building on the work of Nash, Harsanyi, and Shapley, we define a cooperative solution for strategic games that takes account of both the competitive and the cooperative aspects of such games. We prove existence in the general (NTU) case and uniqueness in the TU case. Our main result is an extension of the definition and the existence and uniqueness theorems to stochastic games - discounted or undiscounted.},
	author = {Abraham Neyman and Elon Kohlberg}
}
@booklet {3080,
	title = {Continuous-Time Stochastic Games},
	year = {2012},
	abstract = {Every continuous-time stochastic game with finitely many states and actions has a uniform and limiting-average equilibrium payoff.},
	author = {Abraham Neyman}
}
@booklet {2361,
	title = {Learning Effectiveness and Memory Size},
	howpublished = {Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University.},
	volume = {DP 476},
	year = {2008},
	author = {Abraham Neyman}
}
@booklet {2741,
	title = {Public Goods and Budget Deficit},
	howpublished = {Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University.},
	year = {2006},
	abstract = {We examine incentive-compatible mechanisms for fair financing and efficient selection of a public budget (or public good). A mechanism selects the level of the public budget and imposes taxes on individuals. Individuals{\textquoteright} preferences are quasilinear. Fairness is expressed as weak monotonicity (called scale monotonicity) of the tax imposed on an individual as a function of his benefit from an increased level of the public budget. Efficiency is expressed as selection of a Pareto-optimal level of the public budget. The budget deficit is the difference between the public budget and the total amount of taxes collected from the individuals. We show that any efficient scale-monotonic and incentive-compatible mechanism may generate a budget deficit. Moreover, it is impossible to collect taxes that always cover a fixed small fraction of the total cost.},
	author = {Abraham Neyman and Tim Russo}
}
@booklet {2736,
	title = {Online Concealed Correlation by Boundedly Rational Players},
	howpublished = {Center for the Study of Rationality, DP336},
	year = {2003},
	pages = {DP-336},
	abstract = {In a repeated game with perfect monitoring, correlation among a group of players may evolve in the common course of play (online correlation). Such a correlation may be concealed from a boundedly rational player. The feasibility of such online concealed correlation{\textquoteright}{\textquoteright} is quantified by the individually rational payoff of the boundedly rational player. We show that {\textquoteleft}{\textquoteleft}strong{\textquoteright}{\textquoteright} players, i.e., players whose strategic complexity is less stringently bounded, can orchestrate online correlation of the actions of {\textquoteleft}{\textquoteleft}weak{\textquoteright}{\textquoteright} players, in a manner that is concealed from an opponent of {\textquoteleft}{\textquoteleft}intermediate{\textquoteright}{\textquoteright} strength. The result is illustrated in two models, each captures another aspect of bounded rationality. In the first, players use bounded recall strategies. In the second, players use strategies that are implementable by finite automata.},
	author = {Abraham Neyman and Gilad Bavly}
}
@booklet {2903,
	title = {Online Information Transmission},
	year = {2003},
	author = {Abraham Neyman and Olivier Gossner and Penelope Hernandez}
}
@booklet {2737,
	title = {Online Matching Pennies},
	howpublished = {Center for the Study of Rationality, Discussion Paper 316},
	year = {2003},
	abstract = {We study a repeated game in which one player, the prophet, acquires more information than another player, the follower, about the play that is going to be played. We characterize the optimal amount of information that can be transmitted online by the prophet to the follower, and provide applications to repeated games played by finite automata, and by players with bounded recall.},
	author = {Olivier Gossner and Penelope Hernandez and Abraham Neyman}
}
