@article {2751,
	title = {Repeated games with bounded entropy},
	journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
	volume = {30},
	year = {2000},
	pages = {228{\textendash}247},
	abstract = {We investigate the asymptotic behavior of the maxmin values of repeated two-person zero-sum games with a bound on the strategic entropy of the maximizer{\textquoteright}s strategies while the other player is unrestricted. We will show that if the bound (n), a function of the number of repetitions n, satisfies the condition (n)/n (n), then the maxmin value Wn ((n)) converges to (cavU)(), the concavification of the maxmin value of the stage game in which the maximizer{\textquoteright}s actions are restricted to those with entropy at most . A similar result is obtained for the infinitely repeated games.},
	author = {Abraham Neyman and Daijiro Okada}
}
