@article {2358,
	title = {Growth of Strategy Sets, Entropy, and Nonstationary Bounded Recall},
	journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
	year = {2009},
	pages = {404-425},
	abstract = {The paper initiates the study of long term interactions where players{\textquoteright} bounded rationality varies over time. Time dependent bounded rationality, for player i, is reflected in part in the number ψi(t) of distinct strategies available to him in the first t-stages. We examine how the growth rate of ψi(t) affects equilibrium outcomes of repeated games. An upper bound on the individually rational payoff is derived for a class of two-player repeated games, and the derived bound is shown to be tight. As a special case we study the repeated games with nonstationary bounded recall and show that, a player can guarantee the minimax payoff of the stage game, even against a player with full recall, by remembering a vanishing fraction of the past. A version of the folk theorem is provided for this class of games},
	author = {Abraham Neyman and Daijiro Okada}
}
